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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 This is one of a group of appeals by the City of 
Philadelphia and its officials responsible for the operation of 
the Philadelphia Prison System (referred to collectively as City 
of Philadelphia) from orders of the district court holding it in 
contempt and imposing fines or stipulated penalties because of 
its failure to comply with various provisions of consent decrees 
or related orders designed to ameliorate the overcrowded 
conditions in the Philadelphia prison system. 
 In a separate opinion filed today, we affirm the order 
imposing stipulated penalties of $584,000 for the City's lengthy 
delay in submitting a Facilities Audit and Ten-Year Plan which it 
had undertaken to prepare as part of the Prison Planning Process, 
the long-term solution to overcrowding.  See Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, Nos. 93-1997, 93-2116, & 93-2117 (3d Cir.     , 
1995) (Harris V).  In the same opinion, we reverse the district 
court's dismissal as a sanction of the City's Motion to Modify 
the 1986 and 1991 Consent Decrees.  In a second opinion filed 
today, we affirm the finding of contempt and imposition of a 
$125,000 fine for the City's failure to meet certain occupancy 
standards in the substance and alcohol abuse treatment facility, 
a program the City undertook as one of the short-term solutions 
to the prison population problem.  See Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 94-1286 (3d Cir.     , 1995) (Harris VI). 
  
 This appeal is from the finding of contempt and the 
imposition of a $106,000 penalty for the City's unilateral change 
in the procedure for designation of eligible pretrial detainees 
for release, another of the short-term solutions to prison 
overcrowding.   
I. 
BACKGROUND 
  
 The facts underlying these cases are set forth in 
detail in Harris V, typescript op. at 5-9.  Briefly, the 
plaintiff class of inmates in the Philadelphia prison system and 
the City entered into a Consent Decree approved by the district 
court (the "1986 Consent Decree") to resolve the pending 
complaint alleging unconstitutional prison overcrowding.1  The 
City agreed that while it was working on a long term solution to 
increase the number of prison facilities and beds, it would limit 
the number of inmates in the current facilities.  Thus, the 1986 
Consent Decree set a maximum allowable population ("MAP") by 
July 13, 1987 for the Philadelphia prison system of 3,750 
inmates.  The City agreed that if the inmate population exceeded 
the maximum it would seek the release of pretrial detainees held 
on the lowest bail or sentenced prisoners who had less than sixty 
days remaining to serve on their sentences.  App. at 93.  
However, the 1986 Consent Decree expressly provided that the City 
was not "to seek the release of any person whose release would 
constitute an imminent threat to public safety or to the inmate's 
own health, safety or welfare," or "any person charged with, or 
convicted of, murder or forcible rape."  App. at 93.   If the MAP 
were still exceeded, the City agreed to limit new admissions to 
the prisons except for persons charged with or convicted of 
certain enumerated offenses, hence its denomination as a 
qualified admissions moratorium.     
                     
1
.  See Harris v. Reeves, 761 F. Supp. 382, 384-90 (E.D. Pa. 
1991) (recounting the history of the litigation and efforts to 
alleviate overcrowding prior to the adoption of the 1991 Consent 
Decree).  
  
 Despite the City's efforts between 1986 and 1988 to 
reduce the prison population, the district court was advised that 
on June 3, 1988 there were 3,981 inmates in the Philadelphia 
prisons, 3,035 of whom were pretrial detainees.  As a result, on 
June 6, 1988 the district court ordered that the qualified 
admissions moratorium agreed to in the 1986 Consent Decree go 
into effect, with certain modifications.  See Supp. App. at 1431-
34.  This barred admission until the Philadelphia prison 
population was within the MAP of any additional inmates except 
for persons charged with murder, attempted murder, forcible rape, 
attempted rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 
corrupting the morals of a minor, arson, robbery, kidnapping, 
aggravated assault, or a crime involving the use of a gun or 
knife, or felony drug charges involving specified amounts of 
narcotics.  Supp. App. at 1431-32.  The same order provided for 
release of some inmates on city-provided bail but the court 
stated that "[n]otwithstanding the agreement of the parties" it 
would not "reduce the current population by releasing on parole 
various categories of sentenced inmates."  Supp. App. at 1433. 
 Thereafter, at the request of the District Attorney, 
who had been granted objector status in the litigation, the court 
entered a series of orders excepting additional categories of 
defendants from the qualified admissions moratorium, including 
those accused of domestic violence and abuse, intimidation of 
witnesses or victims, those with two or more open bench warrants 
on non-summary offenses, and those with narcotics offenses 
involving lower quantities than those previously specified.  See 
  
Harris v. Reeves, 761 F. Supp. 382, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1991).  Because 
these modifications to the moratorium increased the prison 
population, the court ordered certain "compensatory measures," 
including release of certain pretrial detainees.  See id..  
 Nonetheless, the prison population continued to grow.  
The court stated that it could "no longer, in good conscience, 
allow the prison population to remain at this dangerously high 
level," Supp. App. at 1296-1301, and by Order dated April 17, 
1989 ("April 1989 Order") instituted new procedures for 
additional release of pretrial detainees.  Supp. App. at 1442.  
This order required the City's Prison Management Unit ("PMU"), a 
unit established by the City at court direction, to submit the 
names of the inmates proposed to be released to the Special 
Master and the District Attorney, who was to forward objections, 
if any, to a listing to the Special Master within 72 hours.  The 
April 1989 Order listed the categories of pretrial detainees 
eligible for release, and expressly provided that detainees 
charged with the enumerated offenses and domestic violence and 
abuse offenses were not to be released.  Supp. App. at 1440-43.   
 These steps stabilized the prison population between 
4,600 and 4,700 for a few months but it soon surged again.  By 
August 1990 the Philadelphia prison population had risen to 
approximately 5000 inmates.  See Supp. App. at 1385.  By order 
entered September 7, 1990 following a hearing, the court ordered 
additional steps to reduce the prison population.2  In addition, 
                     
2
.  The September 7, 1990 Order directed, inter alia, that         
certified youth offenders not be admitted to the prisons and that 
  
on September 21, 1990 the court increased the quantity of 
narcotics charged against defendants excepted from the admissions 
moratorium, see Supp. App. at 1447-48, and issued another order 
detailing the provisions of the then-existing qualified 
admissions moratorium and release mechanism.  See App. at 100-08. 
 The population stood at 4,697 when the court approved a 
new Stipulation and Agreement negotiated by the parties, which it 
entered as an order on March 11, 1991 (the "1991 Consent 
Decree").  The raison d'être for the 1991 Consent Decree was the 
City's suspension of plans to build the 440-bed detention 
facility required under the 1986 Consent Decree.  The background 
leading to the 1991 Consent Decree is discussed in the district 
court's comprehensive opinion in Harris v. Reeves, 761 F. Supp. 
at 382-89, approving the parties' Stipulation and Agreement as 
reasonable.  The 1991 Consent Decree effected a number of 
measures, providing both long-term and short-term relief, 
including, as relevant here, continuance of the qualified 
admissions moratorium as set forth in the September 21, 1990 
Order and modification of the release mechanism for pretrial 
detainees.  App. at 109-46.  It is this release mechanism that 
forms the basis for the dispute at issue here.   
 Paragraph 17(a) of the 1991 Consent Decree requires the 
City to "designate and submit" to the Special Master the names of 
inmates "who meet the criteria of Paragraph 4.E.(i)-(iii) of the 
(..continued) 
the City petition the state courts for early release of sentenced 
inmates who were within sixty days of their scheduled release.  
See Harris v. Reeves, 761 F. Supp. at 388.  
  
September 21, 1990 Order which provides for the release of 
[certain categories of inmates]."3  App. at 116.  Those with 
enumerated offenses ("murder, attempted murder, forcible rape, 
attempted rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 
corrupting the morals of a minor, arson, kidnapping, aggravated 
assault, a crime of violence committed or attempted with a 
firearm, knife or explosive, and escape from custody," and 
certain domestic violence and abuse offenses) are not eligible 
for release.  App. at 116 (¶ 17(a)(2)) (incorporating by 
reference ¶¶ 3A & B of September 21, 1990 Order, App. at 101-02.) 
 Paragraph 17(b) requires the City to submit to the 
Special Master no fewer than thirty-five (35) names per day, at 
least five (5) days per week, whenever the population is in 
excess of 3,750.  App. at 117.  The names of "those designated 
and submitted" by the PMU are to be provided to the District 
Attorney who "then shall have seventy-two (72) hours to 
communicate in writing . . . any alleged errors in application of 
the release criteria . . . or any objections to the release of 
any inmate based on considerations of public safety and supported 
by substantial evidence."  App. at 117 (¶ 17(d)).    
                     
3
.    Paragraph 4.E.(1)-(3) of the September 21, 1990 Order 
provided that "Release categories shall be:  (1) a person 
admitted to prison under prior orders of the court who is still 
detained but who would not be admitted under this order as now 
modified; (2) a prisoner held in default of the lowest amount of 
percentage bail as necessary to reduce the population in all 
institutions to the maximum allowable.  If inmates considered for 
release under this paragraph are held in default of equal amounts 
of bail, preference shall be given to the inmate held the longest 
time[;] (3) a person charged with offenses enumerated in 
paragraphs 3A and B shall not be released pursuant to this 
paragraph."  App. at 104. 
  
 The Special Master, who is required to "direct the 
release of all inmates who meet the criteria set forth in 
Paragraph 17.a," App. at 117, has very limited discretion; he can 
deny a petition "if, but only if," the District Attorney objects 
to a particular release on public safety grounds and designates 
another eligible pretrial detainee as a substitute.  App. at 117 
(¶ 17(e)).  The City must comply with a release order within 
twenty-four hours after receiving it.  App. at 118 (¶ 17(f)).  
The 1991 Consent Decree provides that the City may formulate and 
submit to the court other criteria and procedures for release of 
inmates as a possible alternative or concurrent mechanism.  App. 
at 124 (¶ 30). 
 After the District Attorney unsuccessfully sought to 
block or delay effectuation of the 1991 Consent Decree by appeal, 
the district court ordered the new release mechanism implemented 
on November 25, 1991.  In a memorandum dated December 6, 1991 to 
the PMU and the City Solicitor, the Special Master summarized the 
release procedures in place and noted that many of the inmates 
for whom he would approve release orders would not be immediately 
released.  He explicitly referred, inter alia, to "the inmate 
[who] has other holds such as detainers, sentence deferred cases, 
or more serious charges" (hereafter referred to as "other holds") 
as an example of an inmate who would be designated for release 
but was not to be released.  App. at 502.  Such inmates would 
"remain in custody until the other holds are disposed" of, i.e. 
presumably until the more serious charge, which would be one of 
the enumerated charges, was dropped or otherwise disposed of or 
  
until inmates on detainer or writs were transferred to the 
jurisdiction that issued them. 
 The 1991 Consent Decree contained a stipulated fine of 
$100.00 a day for each inmate "who should be designated for 
release in accordance with Paragraph 17 but is not so 
designated."  App. at 119 (¶ 19(b)(2)).  But "[d]efendants shall 
not incur fines . . . if they submit to the Special Master at 
least thirty-five (35) names per day meeting the other 
requirements of Paragraph 17, even if a greater number of inmates 
meets the criteria set forth in Paragraph 17.a."  App. at 119  
(¶ 19(c)). 
 Between the weeks ending November 25, 1991 and June 29, 
1992 the City included in its daily list of thirty-five names 
pretrial detainees who had any charge that was eligible for 
release under what has come to be known as "Harris v. Reeves 
Sign-Own Bail" (generally shortened to "HvR-SOB"),4 even though 
the detainee may have been subject to other holds or charges 
which would prevent an immediate release.  App. at 479.  The 
City's list of 175 names included inmates who were not eligible 
for release at that time as well as duplicative names because 
inmates were listed by charge so that a single inmate charged 
with more than one non-enumerated charge could be listed several 
times.  Therefore, many fewer than the 175 listed were released.  
                     
4
.  Under the "Sign-Own Bail" program the district court had 
directed the City to post bail for certain inmates held in 
default of bail, principally those with low designated bail or 
held in prison for lengthy periods. 
  
The effect of the procedure followed before July 1992 was to 
reduce bail on those charges that were not excepted from release, 
so that inmates with "other holds" could be released or 
transferred to another jurisdiction as soon as the basis for the 
"other hold" was cleared. 
 The events that gave rise to this particular contempt 
action began in early July 1992 when PMU revised its procedures 
in preparing the release lists following a meeting in the City 
Solicitor's office between Jeanne Bonney, the Director of PMU, 
and three members of the District Attorney's staff.  There were 
also subsequent communications between Bonney and James Jordan, 
Chair of the Litigation Group of the City Solicitor's office, Ann 
Pasquariello, a Deputy City Solicitor, and a Special Assistant to 
the Mayor.  App. at 482.  Under the new procedure instituted, PMU 
only listed inmates who were eligible for immediate release.  
App. at 483.  In addition, PMU stopped designating those 
detainees who the City deemed to be "a danger to themselves or to 
the community."  App. at 483.  
 The new policy was formally defined in a memorandum to 
PMU dated August 5, 1992 by the City Solicitor's representative, 
Jordan, who directed that PMU list by defendants, not by charge, 
stating  
 Please discontinue the prior practice of 
listing by the charged offense irrespective 
of whether the defendant in question is 
absolutely ineligible for release under the 
applicable criteria.  Thus, you should not 
list any defendant with any outstanding 
charge or other matter which would disqualify 
that inmate from release under the provisions 
of the relevant Harris orders. 
  
 
App. at 426.  Jordan specified the following four categories of 
detainees who had previously been listed and who were now not to 
be listed for release: (1) those with "other holds," (2) those 
with state or federal detainers who are being held on enumerated 
offenses, (3) those not eligible for release on the face of their 
charges, and (4) those who are a danger to themselves or to the 
community.  App. at 426-27, 485.   
 Jordan also notified the Special Master and counsel for 
plaintiffs of the policy changes on August 5, 1992, stating, "I 
have instituted these changes in policy based upon my careful 
reading of the appropriate consent decrees, orders, stipulations 
and opinions."  App. at 530.  Plaintiffs' counsel objected to 
these changed procedures, and the Special Master notified the 
court.  App. at 525-29.5   
 In response to the plaintiffs' objections, on 
September 24, 1992 the City Solicitor directed PMU to resume 
listing all "persons who are a danger to themselves or the 
community" but to submit those names separately under protest.  
PMU has since submitted "under protest, pending modification of 
the Decree," a "D" list with those inmates who need special 
mental health treatment and a "B" list with those inmates held on 
bail in excess of $75,000.  App. at 440-41, 492-93.   
                     
5
.  Starting the week of August 10, 1992, PMU prepared two lists 
of inmates--one was the release list and the other was the list 
of inmates who would have been designated before the change in 
procedure instructed in Jordan's August 5 memorandum.  App. at 
486. 
  
 Director of PMU Bonney wrote a memorandum dated August 
10, 1992 to Commissioner J. Patrick Gallagher and Deputy 
Commissioner Thomas Costello predicting that as a result of the 
City's change in procedure, there would be a substantial increase 
in pretrial inmate days, PMU's costs for continuous research and 
tracking would double, and that "at least 63 additional persons 
will remain in custody each week for an additional 30 days: an 
average 252 inmates per month, or 7,560 inmate days."  App. at 
552-53.  In fact, during the weeks beginning August 10 through 
September 28, 1992, the number of inmates submitted by the City 
each week ranged from 45 to 101.  App. at 493-94.  
 Plaintiffs filed a Motion on October 16, 1992 for 
Contempt Sanctions Against Defendants for Failure to Comply with 
the Court's March 11, 1991 Order.  Supp. App. at 1501-14.  The 
parties submitted the matter for disposition on a Stipulation of 
Facts and the deposition of the Director of PMU.  The parties 
stipulated that from the week of July 6, 1992 through the week of 
November 16, 1992, the City would have listed 1,060 additional 
detainees had it followed its previous listing practices.  At the 
hearing on contempt, the district court was visibly unimpressed 
with the City's argument that because it had not violated a clear 
and unambiguous provision of the consent decree, it should not be 
held in contempt for its unilateral implementation of the changes 
in procedures,6 App. at 689-712, but the court nevertheless 
                     
6
.  The court stated "[i]t's not clear to me why the matter 
wasn't raised with the Court before the action was taken if you 
were in doubt as to what the obligations were."  App. at 689.   
  
entertained arguments from the parties and the District 
Attorney's office on the proper interpretation of the provisions 
for the release mechanism in the 1991 Consent Decree.  See App. 
at 669-732.   
 In a Memorandum and Order dated June 14, 1993 the 
district court found the City in contempt of the 1991 Consent 
Decree and imposed a $106,000 fine, $55,000 which was to be paid 
forthwith.  The fine was calculated on the basis of $100 for each 
inmate not designated on each release list from July 6, 1992 to 
November 16, 1992.  The court ordered that the remainder of the 
fine might not be imposed if the City submitted an alternative 
plan to the release mechanism by July 30, 1993.  The City paid 
the $55,000 fine but did not submit an alternative plan to the 
release mechanism and moved for reconsideration of the contempt 
finding.  On September 14, 1993, the district court implicitly 
denied the motion for reconsideration and imposed the $51,000 
balance of the fine.  The City then filed a Motion Requesting 
that Contempt Fines Not Be Imposed, which the court denied by a 
Memorandum Opinion of February 16, 1994.  The City appeals.   
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 A. 
 Applicable Legal Principles 
 The City makes three interconnected arguments on 
appeal: first, that the district court failed to find that the 
City violated a clear and unambiguous court order for the 
implementation of the prisoner release mechanism; second, that 
  
the 1991 Consent Decree does not in fact contain a clear and 
unambiguous mandate as to the procedures the City was to follow 
in implementing the prisoner release mechanism; and third, that 
the district court's legal interpretation of the 1991 Consent 
Decree was erroneous.  Thus, the City seeks reversal of the 
district court's order of contempt, remission of all penalties, a 
declaration that the district court's interpretation of the 
consent decree is erroneous, and a holding that the City may 
continue to implement its revised release procedures.  
 The imposition of contempt is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard and will only be disturbed if there is an 
error of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.  United 
States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 727 (3d Cir. 1993).  We 
determine on a plenary basis whether the district court committed 
an error of law.  See Sansom Comm. by Cook v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 
1535, 1539 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984).7  
 The relevant legal principles are not difficult nor in 
dispute.  Therefore, we need not pass through the litany of law 
relating to the prerequisites for a finding of contempt, which we 
have reviewed to the extent pertinent in our opinion today in 
Harris V, typescript op. at 35-36.  Instead, we concentrate on 
the application of the principle that is at issue.   
                     
7
.  In our other Harris opinions today, we discuss and reject the 
City's argument that our review of a finding of contempt is 
plenary.  See Harris V, typescript op. at 21 & n.11; Harris VI, 
typescript op. at 17 n.5. 
  
 Specificity in the terms of consent decrees is a 
predicate to a finding of contempt, see Inmates of the Allegheny 
County Jail v. Wecht, 754 F.2d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1985), because 
"a person will not be held in contempt . . . unless the order has 
given him fair warning."  See United States v. Christie 
Industries, Inc., 465 F.2d 1002, 1006 (3d Cir. 1972).  This is 
reflected in the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) that an 
injunction "shall be specific in terms," and shall describe "in 
reasonable detail" the act or acts sought to be restrained, a 
rule also applicable to consent decrees.  See Angela R. v. 
Clinton, 999 F.2d 320, 325 (8th Cir. 1993).  
 The Supreme Court has held that persons may not be 
placed at risk of contempt unless they have been given specific 
notice of the norm to which they must pattern their conduct.   
See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine 
Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967); see also Granny Goose Foods, 
Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974); 
Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974); Gunn v. University 
Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 388-89 (1970).   
 We have summarized the applicable law as follows: "In 
order to cite a person for contempt for violating a court order, 
two principles, each a corollary of the other, must, among other 
requirements, be established.  The first of these is that it must 
be proved that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the order 
which he is said to have violated.  The corollary of this 
proposition is that the order which is said to have been violated 
must be specific and definite."  Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald 
  
v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting In re 
Rubin, 378 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1967)).  We explained that 
these two principles are merged in the general statement that:  
"An order may be so vague or indefinite that, even though the 
alleged contemnor is chargeable with knowledge of such order, he 
cannot be punished for doing what he did in view of lack of 
certainty as to what it prohibited or directed."  Holtzman, 775 
F.2d at 544 (quoting Rubin, 378 F.2d at 108).   
 We decide on a plenary basis whether the consent decree 
is ambiguous.  See Fox v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 319-20 (3d Cir. 1982).  The resolution of 
ambiguities ought to favor the party charged with contempt.  See 
United States on behalf of IRS v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 774 (3d 
Cir. 1983); Ford v. Kammerer, 450 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1971).  
In other words, a contempt citation should not be granted if 
"there is 'ground to doubt the wrongfulness' of" the defendant's 
conduct.  Quinter v. Volkswagen of America, 676 F.2d 969, 974 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (citing Fox v. Capital Co., 96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 
1938)).     
 It is because we must find not only that the contemnor 
had knowledge of the order but also that the order was "specific 
and definite" that a finding of contempt cannot be based merely 
on the City's alteration of its prior policy without seeking 
court approval or modification, which some language in the 
district court's opinion suggests was the basis for its contempt 
  
finding.8  Absent any provision in the 1991 Consent Decree or an 
order of the court requiring the City to seek court approval 
before modifying its practice, its mere failure to do so before 
changing its procedures for implementing the release mechanism is 
not alone enough to sustain a contempt finding.   
 Courts must be careful not to impose obligations upon 
the parties beyond those they have voluntarily assumed.  See, 
e.g., Fox, 680 F.2d at 319; Johnson v. Robinson, 987 F.2d 1043, 
1046 (4th Cir. 1993); Walker v. United States Dep't of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1990).  A consent 
decree "must be construed as it is written, and not as it might 
have been written had the plaintiff established his factual 
claims and legal theories in litigation."  United States v. 
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). 
 There is no provision here requiring the City to seek 
prior approval from the court before modifying its policy, as 
appears in some consent decrees.  See, e.g., Gautreaux v. 
Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (consent decree 
provides that "HUD may change the terms of [contract with private 
agency required by consent decree] in the future . . . provided 
that none of the services provided for the benefit of eligible 
persons will be reduced or modified to their detriment without 
                     
8
.   For example, the court stated, "[t]he court finds the City 
in contempt for its unilateral decision to modify the release 
mechanism with respect to detainees with 'other holds,'" Addenda 
to City's Brief at A-15, and "[t]he court finds the City in 
contempt for its unilateral decision to modify the release 
mechanism with respect to detainees deemed 'a danger to 
themselves or the community.'"  Addenda to City's Brief at A-23. 
  
Court approval"), aff'd, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); Oburn v. 
Shapp, 393 F. Supp. 561, 570 (E.D. Pa.) ("if there was . . . a 
change in the selection procedure [in related case] the consent 
decree in [that case] requires the defendants . . . to submit it 
to the court for approval"), aff'd, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975).  
We can understand the court's displeasure that the City, which 
was in continuous contact with the court9, made "no effort to 
determine whether the court shared [its] understanding of the 
Stipulation and Agreement before the changes were unilaterally 
implemented," Addenda to City's Brief at A-12, but however 
discourteous and ultimately counterproductive the City's conduct 
was, it was not contemptuous in itself.  Moreover, the City did 
notify both the Special Master and the plaintiffs' counsel almost 
contemporaneously with its change in policy, so the plaintiffs' 
accusation that the City was trying to "play games" with the 
court may fall short.  
 The City argues that it did not violate any clear and 
unambiguous provision of the 1991 Consent Decree.  Paragraph 17 
(b) of that Decree provides that the City "shall submit no fewer 
than thirty-five (35) names per day, at least five (5) days per 
week, whenever the population is in excess of 3,750."  App. at 
117 (emphasis added).  The City acknowledges that once it changed 
its policy as to the inmates to be included on the list, it 
failed to list 35 inmates a day or 175 a week.  Plaintiffs do not 
                     
9
.   In its opinion approving the 1991 Consent Decree, the 
district court noted that it had held 29 status conferences on 
the case up to that date.  Harris v. Reeves, 761 F. Supp. at 388. 
  
contend that the City could be held in violation of the 1991 
Consent Decree for failure to list 35 inmates a day if there were 
not that many inmates who fit the criteria for listing.10 
 The district court held the City liable for contempt 
for failure to list the following three categories of prisoners 
beginning in early July 1992: inmates with other holds; inmates 
held on enumerated offenses who have state or federal detainers; 
and inmates who, according to the City, "are a danger to 
themselves or the community."11  Thus we focus on whether it was 
clear and unambiguous that prisoners falling within each such 
category should have been listed. 
 B. 
        Inmates 
With Other Holds 
 The district court included within this category 
inmates who are detained on enumerated charges and at least one 
non-enumerated charge.  Before early July 1992 these inmates were 
included on the proposed release lists submitted by PMU, but were 
                     
10
.  In approving the 1991 Consent Decree, the district court 
stated that "the Stipulation and Agreement requires the 
imposition of fines if the City fails to submit 175 petitions 
only if there are 175 eligible inmates."  Harris v. Reeves, 761 
F. Supp. at 398 n.17 (emphasis added).  
11
.  The City also changed its prior practice of listing inmates 
who on the face of their charges are not eligible for release.  
The district court found that the City was not in contempt in 
modifying the procedures in this category because the 
modifications were consistent with the 1991 Consent Decree.  
Therefore, this category is not under consideration in this 
appeal. 
 
  
not included after Jordan's instructions.  The City contends that 
it is not required to list inmates who would not be eligible for 
immediate release.  Thus, it continues, it is not required to 
list inmates who are charged with a non-enumerated offense for 
which bail may be reduced if that inmate is also charged with an 
enumerated offense, which is generally a crime of violence, 
because the charge on the enumerated offense precludes immediate  
release. 
    The plaintiff counters, and the district court agreed, 
that the City must list inmates with both enumerated and non-
enumerated offenses so that the inmates can be immediately 
released if and when the enumerated charges are dropped or 
otherwise disposed of.  It is not contested that failure to list 
such inmates under the release mechanism added three to four 
weeks to the release process if the enumerated charges were 
dismissed. 
  The district court commented that the Special Master 
contemplated that a detainee in this category would be listed for 
release on non-enumerated charges even if held on some other 
enumerated charge.  The issue is not, however, whether the 
Special Master or even the district court contemplated the City's 
listing of this category of inmates, but whether that requirement 
is unambiguously stated.12  We therefore turn to the relevant 
language.    
                     
12
.   Plaintiffs point to the following statement by the district 
court in Harris v. Reeves, 761 F. Supp. at 398, as evidence that 
the City must list inmates with both enumerated and non-numerated 
offenses.  "There will be other categories of inmates eligible 
  
 Under Paragraph 17(a) of the 1991 Consent Decree: 
  Defendants shall designate and submit to the Special 
Master the names of inmates who meet the criteria of 
Paragraph 4.E.(i)-(iii) of the September 21, 1990 Order 
which provides for the release of: 
 (1) all persons admitted to the prisons under prior 
orders of the court who are still detained but who 
would not be admitted under the provisions of this 
order as now modified; 
 (2) prisoners held in default of the lowest amount of 
percentage bail as necessary to reduce the population 
in all institutions to the maximum allowable 
populations.  If inmates considered for release under 
this paragraph are held in default of equal amounts of 
bail, preference shall be given to the inmate held the 
longest time.  Persons charged with offenses enumerated 
in paragraphs 3A and B [of the September 21, 1990 
Order] shall not be released pursuant to this 
paragraph.  
 
 Two paragraphs of the September 21, 1990 Order are 
referenced in paragraph 17(a).  The first reference is to 
paragraph 4.E.(i)-(iii) which describes the "release categories" 
in the exact same language as in paragraph 17(a) (except that the 
plural is used in paragraph 17(a)).  See note 3 supra.   The 
other reference is to paragraphs 3A and B of the September 21, 
1990 Order which enumerated the pending charges that excepted 
inmates from release.  In essence, paragraph 17 merely provides 
that in order to reduce the population of the overcrowded prisons 
(..continued) 
for release.  For example, the City will be able to submit the 
names of those inmates who were admitted to the prisons because 
they were charged with excepted offenses, are now eligible for 
release because the excepted charges have been dismissed but are 
still held on other non-excepted charges."  Id. (emphasis added).  
This is hardly an unqualified statement that the City must 
include such inmates if needed to meet its quota.  It was made, 
instead, in the context of responding to the District Attorney's 
concern about the pool of inmates "eligible for release," not 
about those who need be listed.   
  
the City would release those prisoners who, under the qualified 
admissions moratorium, would not now be detained, and those 
prisoners who are not charged with one of the enumerated offenses 
in the order of longest-in, earliest-out. 
 The City's argument that it need not include on its 
list those prisoners who are charged with any enumerated offense 
is a plausible one from the language of the 1991 Consent Decree.  
It must "designate and submit" only the names of inmates who 
"meet the criteria" of the referenced paragraph of the September 
21, 1990 Order.  Inmates charged with "enumerated" offenses do 
not "meet the criteria" and therefore need not be listed. 
 Plaintiffs' argument "that the pool of eligible 
candidates was defined by the City's practice prior to July 
1992," Appellees' Brief at 30, is not persuasive.  While prior 
practice may be of assistance in interpreting a contract for 
purposes other than contempt, prior practice does not provide the 
clarity of language that precedent informs us is a predicate for 
any contempt ruling.  Authority cited by plaintiffs in support of 
the principle that a consent decree must be construed in light of 
its purpose is to the same effect.  In fact, in the case cited, 
In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 
1982), the court affirmed the contempt citation because the 
conduct violated "both the letter and spirit" of the underlying 
order.  Id. at 1157 (emphasis added).     
 We cannot find an unambiguous provision in the 1991 
Consent Decree or otherwise requiring the City to designate 
  
inmates with other holds for purposes of the release mechanism.13  
Therefore, we cannot uphold this portion of the contempt finding.  
     C. 
 Inmates with State or Federal Detainers 
   The district court included under this category both 
those inmates held on enumerated offenses who also were subject 
to state or federal detainers for, inter alia, parole or 
probation violations and those inmates "on writ," i.e. those who 
are here for court appearance.  To the extent that the district 
court's finding of contempt was based on the fact that the City 
had previously listed these inmates, our rejection of prior 
practice to clarify an ambiguous requirement under the consent 
decree in this context is equally applicable here.                
 The City, applying the same analysis as it used with 
respect to inmates held on both enumerated and non-enumerated 
charges, argues that "had the City designated and submitted the 
names of these inmates for release, they would not have been 
released, because they were being held not only on detainers, but 
also on enumerated charges."  Appellants' Reply Brief at 8.  
While we concluded above that the City's argument as applied to 
inmates held on both enumerated and non-enumerated charges 
persuaded us that there was a legitimate ambiguity that precluded 
                     
13
.  We do not decide whether the language of the 1991 Consent 
Decree was such that the district court, using permissible 
interpretative aids or evidence, can construe it to support an 
order requiring the City to list this category of inmate in the 
future.  The only issue before us is whether the language is 
sufficiently clear that the City must do so that its failure to 
act in this manner supports a contempt finding.  
  
a finding of contempt for failure to list inmates in that 
category, we are not similarly persuaded as to inmates held on 
detainer.  Of course, these inmates, like those held on 
enumerated and non-enumerated charges, were not eligible for 
"release" to the general population.  Unlike the other category 
of inmates, however, these inmates could have been eligible for 
"release" from the Philadelphia prisons by being transferred to 
some other jurisdiction.   
   In this connection, we cannot dismiss as irrelevant 
the district court's reliance on the fact that the First Deputy 
City Solicitor had notified the court by letter to the Special 
Master dated January 17, 1992 that the City "did not object to 
transferring inmates with state parole detainers" even though 
they had been charged and were being held in Philadelphia on one 
or more enumerated charges.  This is relevant not to show prior 
practice but to show that listing inmates with detainers from 
other jurisdictions could, in fact, have effected their removal 
from the Philadelphia prisons, with a consequent reduction in 
overcrowding. 
 Moreover, the 1991 Consent Decree, unlike the September 
21, 1990 Order, does not provide any basis for construing the 
term "release" as a term of art.  Paragraph 4.A. of the September 
21, 1990 Order required listing of a detainee "for release by 
court order on his or her own recognizance (HvR-SOB), on 
electronic monitoring (HvR-EM) or to a community corrections 
facility (HvR-CCF)."  App. at 103.  It follows that it would be 
reasonable to construe the listing requirement of the September 
  
21, 1990 Order as applicable only to a detainee released on one 
of these three types of releases. 
 On the other hand, Paragraph 18 of the 1991 Consent 
Decree expressly provides that Paragraph 4.A. of the September 
21, 1990 Order (which set forth these three types of release) is 
superseded.  See App. at 118 ("The procedures set forth in 
Paragraph 17 of this Stipulation and Agreement shall supersede 
Paragraphs 4.A.-C. of the September 21, 1990 Order.").  This 
removes any argument based on "release" as a term of art. 
 We have earlier accepted the City's argument that it 
should not be held in contempt for not listing prisoners with 
both enumerated and non-enumerated charges because, in its words,  
"the decree appears to contemplate that prisoners listed actually 
will be eligible to be set free, i.e., released, not just to have 
their bail reduced to 'HvR-SOB' on a single charge."  Appellants' 
Brief at 37.  That argument has no force when dealing with 
prisoners on detainers who are eligible to be released to other 
authorities. 
        In our prior discussion, we have recognized that 
ambiguities redound to the benefit of the contemnor.  This does 
not mean that a party can avoid following an injunction or court 
order "on merely technical grounds."  See Christie Indus., 465 
F.2d at 1007.  In sustaining the finding of contempt in In Re 
Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig. we looked to the "thrust of 
the . . . order."  689 F.2d at 1156.  We find it incontrovertible 
that the "thrust" of the 1991 Consent Decree was to move out of 
the Philadelphia prisons those who could be reasonably moved 
  
elsewhere.  This entailed, inter alia, even the establishment of 
a program for alcohol and drug dependent inmates in another 
facility, the subject of our opinion in Harris VI.   
 There is no language that supports the City's failure 
to list inmates who might reasonably be transferred to other 
jurisdictions, or, as in the case of those "on writ," who might 
not be needed for immediate trial.14  Instead, by not listing 
these inmates the City deprived plaintiffs, the Special Master, 
and the court of the opportunity of arranging for their removal, 
even if temporary, from the Philadelphia prisons.15  Even 
Jordan's memorandum of August 5, 1992 recognized that such 
transfer could have been viable, for it stated: 
 Please do not continue to list persons with State or 
Federal detainers and charged with enumerated offenses 
who are to be transferred to another jurisdiction.  
Such persons are not required to be listed on the 
Harris release orders.  We will work with the courts 
and the District Attorney's Office to improve the 
efficiency of available mechanisms for transfer of such 
persons. 
 
                     
14
.   The parties have not clarified whether there is a pertinent 
distinction between inmates on federal and state detainers, to 
which our discussion applies, and those "on writ."  To the extent 
that those "on writ" also have pending against them an enumerated 
charge, and might have been eligible for transfer elsewhere, 
failure to list them is encompassed by this discussion.  If those 
inmates present a different situation the matter can be 
clarified, and presumably resolved between the parties and the 
court, within the framework of this opinion when it returns to 
the district court for modification of the amount of the 
sanction.  
15
.  We need not decide whether each of these prisoners would 
have been transferred.  We recognize that there may have been 
some objection.  Instead, failure to list them deprived            
the court or its representative of any opportunity to consider 
such objection, if raised in a particular case.  
  
App. at 426 (emphasis added).  We will therefore sustain the 
finding of contempt for failure to list inmates in this category. 
 D. 
 Inmates Who Are a "Danger to Themselves or to Others"  
 Jordan described the final category of inmates whom he 
directed PMU to stop listing as part of the release mechanism as 
"persons who are a danger to themselves or to others."  App. at   
426.  The City cannot have been unaware that such a 
characterization would give the impression that the district 
court was directing the release of "dangerous" inmates without 
concern for the public welfare.  In Jordan's memorandum of 
September 24, 1992 Jordan directed PMU to list as "dangerous" 
those inmates whose bail is set at $75,000 or higher or who 
require mental health treatment.  Defining "dangerous" inmates in 
this manner does not arise out of anything in the 1991 Consent 
Decree, nor indeed out of any of the earlier stipulations, 
agreements, or court orders. 
 Further, the City stipulated that the 1991 Consent 
Decree contains no explicit exception to the release mechanism 
for inmates whom the City deemed to be "a danger to themselves or 
to the community."  App. at 483.   
 To justify its decision not to list for the release 
mechanism this category of inmates, the City refers us not to any 
provision of the 1991 Consent Decree but to Paragraph 4 of the 
1986 Consent Decree which states the City agrees not to seek the 
release of any person charged with, or convicted of, murder or 
forcible rape or "whose release would constitute an imminent 
  
threat to public safety or the inmate's own health, safety or 
welfare."  App. at 93.  In order to analyze the City's argument, 
it is necessary to recall that throughout the history of this 
litigation, beginning with the 1986 Consent Decree, there were 
offenses enumerated in both the release mechanism and the 
admissions moratorium to which those provisions did not apply.  
Presumably the parties enumerated the offenses they deemed 
identified inmates or defendants who presented the greatest 
danger to the public interest.  Inasmuch as the admissions 
moratorium in the 1986 Consent Decree did not have any general 
exception under which the City could except those whom it 
believed were a threat to public safety comparable to the 
provision in the release mechanism, and it is as much a danger to 
public safety to refuse to admit a person charged with "or 
convicted" of a crime as it is to release that person if s/he is 
already in prison, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties 
equated the crimes excepted from the admissions moratorium as 
somewhat equivalent to those that constitute a threat to public 
safety.  This equivalency runs through the various subsequent 
orders. 
 As detailed before, the 1986 Consent Decree was 
unsuccessful in effecting any significant short-term relief, and 
when the admissions moratorium went into effect in June 1988 it 
was the District Attorney (not the City) who, notwithstanding the 
denial of his intervenor status, petitioned the district court on 
a number of occasions and was successful in getting the court to 
order additional exceptions from the qualified admissions 
  
moratorium for certain additional categories of charges.  See 
Harris v. Reeves, 761 F. Supp. at 387.   
 None of the orders modifying or expanding the release 
mechanism and/or the qualified admissions moratorium addressed 
the "dangerous" inmate as such, i.e. outside the context of a 
specified crime.  Notably, when the release mechanism was revised 
by the Order of April 17, 1989, it expressly provided for notice 
to the District Attorney who could notify the Special Master "of 
objections."  Supp. App. at 1442.  However, when the 
ineffectiveness of the 1986 Consent Decree became evident, and 
the City abandoned its plans for long-term relief, the parties, 
i.e. the City and the plaintiffs, renegotiated their agreement to 
the 1991 Consent Decree, that document did address the dangerous 
prisoner/public safety issue.  In paragraph 17(e), the 1991 
Consent Decree gave the District Attorney the right to object to 
release of a prisoner on public safety grounds.  Notably, the 
1991 Consent Decree did not incorporate a provision in the April 
17, 1989 Order and the September 21, 1990 Order providing that 
PMU, the City's contractor, "shall . . . note" any information 
indicative that the listed inmate would "pose a risk of harm" if 
released.  See App. at 103; Supp. App. at 1442.  In holding the 
City in contempt for deciding, with no support in the language of 
the 1991 Consent Decree, that it need not list prisoners who are 
mentally ill and those for whom bail was set at $75,000, the 
district court held that paragraph 17(e) superseded the paragraph 
in the 1986 Consent Decree on which the City relied.   
  
 The City argues that it is a separate and distinct 
entity from the District Attorney, so that its policy of "not 
listing dangerous inmates follows common sense."  Appellants' 
Brief at 44.  We prefer not to comment on the "common sense" of 
the City or its representatives who have agreed to the procedures 
established in the orders and consent decrees at issue, and who 
unilaterally imposed the change in interpretation and procedures 
which precipitated the contempt findings resulting in this series 
of appeals. 
 We conclude that the district court's interpretation of 
Paragraph 17(e) of the 1991 Consent Decree as superseding 
Paragraph 4 of the 1986 Consent Decree is not erroneous, under 
even the most searching review.  Although Paragraph 18 in the 
1991 Consent Decree states that all unamended provisions of the 
September 21, 1990 Order remain in full force and effect, it 
explicitly modifies the release mechanism provisions in the 
September 21, 1990 Order.  Paragraph 18 of the 1991 Consent 
Decree states that the release mechanism in Paragraph 17 
supersedes Paragraphs 4.A-C of the September 21, 1990 Order but 
that otherwise the 1991 decree "shall not affect the operation of 
the September 21, 1990 Order or Paragraphs 1 and 2.a-c and h-i of 
the remedial provisions of the Consent Order of December 30, 
1986."  App. at 119 (emphasis added).  Therefore, Paragraph 17 
superseded the release mechanism of the September 21, 1990 Order 
and explicitly preserved only Paragraphs 1 and 2.a-c and h-i of 
  
the 1986 Consent Decree.16  Paragraph 4 of the 1986 Consent 
Decree from which the City derives its authority to not list 
"dangerous" inmates has not been preserved by the 1991 Consent 
Decree. 
 The City argues that this interpretation is incorrect 
because under the 1991 Consent Decree the District Attorney has 
the power to prevent an inmate's release only if the District 
Attorney can designate another eligible inmate to be released.  
There are several responses.  The first, and most obvious, is 
that this is the provision to which the City agreed.  We prefer 
not to speculate as to the reason.  The second is that every 
inmate at issue in this case is a pretrial detainee for whom bail 
has been set and who, if s/he could provide that bail, would be 
walking the streets.  The third is that if we agreed with the 
City, Paragraph 17(e) of the 1991 Consent Decree specifying the 
District Attorney as the one who could prevent release on "public 
safety" grounds upon substitution of another inmate would be 
surplusage, because the City could designate any inmate without 
such substitution. 
    In rejecting the City's defense to contempt on this 
ground the district court agreed that inmates suffering from 
mental illness are "poor candidates for release," but noted that 
                     
16
.  The City maintains that when the 1991 Consent Decree 
superseded provisions of the earlier orders it specifically so 
stated.  But the City fails to take the further step to evaluate 
how the release mechanism evolved over time and how the authority 
to prevent releases of "dangerous inmates" was shifted from the 
City to the District Attorney.  
  
they should be held, if at all, in the prison health services 
wing which is not subject to the 1991 Consent Decree and then 
would be properly excluded from release lists.  Addenda to City's 
Brief at A-23.  The City offers no response.  The district court 
also stated that the amount of bail is an inadequate  
determination of dangerousness.  We assume that the dispute on 
this category is in large part focused on certain defendants 
charged with drug crimes, which are not excepted from the release 
provision of the 1991 Consent Decree.   
  In light of the plain language of the 1991 Consent 
Decree read in the context of the history of the "danger" 
provision set forth above, we will affirm the district court's 
finding that the City violated an unambiguous provision of the 
1991 Consent Decree by failing to list inmates who fell into the 
two categories it deemed "dangerous."17   
 III. 
 CONCLUSION 
 We will reverse the finding of contempt for failure to 
list inmates who were charged with enumerated as well as non-
enumerated offenses, and we will affirm the finding of contempt 
for failure to list inmates with state or federal detainers and 
inmates who are a danger to themselves or others.  Because this 
will require a corresponding revision of the penalty which was 
                     
 
17
.  We find the argument that the court continues to monitor and 
enforce other provisions in paragraph 4 of the 1986 Consent 
Decree unavailing.  This practice may be unnecessary but it is 
not before us.   
  
calculated based on each inmate per day who should have been 
listed but was not, we will remand for recalculation of the 
penalty. 
 We observe that the three opinions issued today are not 
independent of each other, although we have treated them 
separately for convenience.  Indeed, they are interrelated parts 
of a complex ongoing litigation in which we believe the public 
interest would best have been served had the parties been able to 
maintain the same degree of cooperation that characterized their 
original entry of the Consent Decrees and Stipulations.  
Moreover, as we observed in the opinion in Harris V, many of the 
issues that divide the parties in this case with respect to the 
release mechanism might have been obviated had the district court 
considered the merits of the Motion to Modify.  We trust that on 
remand steps will be taken to insure that the divisions that 
characterize the disputes that are the subject of this opinion 
will not recur. 
__________________________________ 
 
Harris v. The City of Philadelphia 
No. 93-1988 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
 
 I join parts I, IIA, and IIB of the opinion of the 
court.  I cannot, however, agree with the court that the City of 
Philadelphia was properly held in contempt for ceasing to list 
(a) inmates with detainers who were ineligible for release 
because they were held on "enumerated" offenses and (b) inmates 
whom the City believed posed an imminent danger to the community 
or to themselves. 
 
 A.  INMATES WITH DETAINERS.  As the court acknowledges, 
a party may not be held in contempt unless it violates a 
"`specific and definite'" court order.  Maj. typescript at 17 
(citations omitted).  See also Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. 
Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 
104, 108 (3d Cir. 1967).  In ceasing to list inmates who were 
charged in Philadelphia with "enumerated" (i.e., serious 
offenses) and who also had detainers lodged against them, the 
City did not, in my view, violate any specific and definite 
prohibition.  I analyze this question in two steps. 
 First, as the court appears to recognize (see Maj. 
typescript at 23), the City was not required to list inmates who 
were ineligible for release under paragraph 17a of the 1991 
Consent Decree.  Paragraph 17 of the 1991 Consent Decree (the 
  
provision that the district court found that the City had 
violated) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 a. Defendants shall designate and submit to the 
Special Master the names of inmates who meet the 
criteria of Paragraph 4.E(i)-(iii) of the 
September 22, 1990 Order which provides for the 
release of: 
 
  (1) all persons admitted to the prisons 
under prior orders of the court who 
are still detained but who would 
not be admitted under the 
provisions of this order as now 
modified; 
 
  (2) prisoners held in default of the 
lowest amount of percentage bail as 
necessary to reduce the population 
in all institutions to the maximum 
allowable populations.  If inmates 
considered for release under this 
paragraph are held in default of 
equal amounts of bail, preference 
shall be given to the inmate held 
the longest time.  Persons charged 
with offenses enumerated in 
paragraphs 3A and 3B18 shall not be 
released pursuant to this 
paragraph. . . . 
 
                     
18
.  These paragraphs listed the following offenses: 
 
 A. Murder, attempted murder, forcible rape, attempted 
rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 
corrupting the morals of a minor, arson, 
kidnapping, aggravated assault, a crime of 
violence committed or attempted with a firearm, 
knife, or explosives, and escape from custody. 
 
 B. Domestic Violence and Abuse Offenses. . . . 
 
JA101. 
  
 e.  The Special Master shall direct the release of all 
inmates who meet the criteria set forth in Paragraph 
17.a. . . . 
 
JA116-17 (emphasis added).  Thus, paragraph 17a requires the 
defendants to submit to the Special Master the names of inmates 
who meet the specified criteria for release, and paragraph 17e 
requires the Special Master to "direct the release of all 
inmates" who meet those criteria.  JA117.  Accordingly, it seems 
clear that the defendants were not obligated to submit the names 
of inmates who were ineligible for release under paragraph 17a. 
 Second, it is at least arguable that all inmates 
charged with enumerated offenses (including those inmates who 
were charged with enumerated offenses and who also had detainers 
lodged against them) were ineligible for release under paragraph 
17a.  Paragraph 17a(2) of the 1991 Consent Decree, which was 
quoted in full above, states in relevant part: 
 Persons charged with offenses enumerated in 
paragraphs 3A and 3B shall not be released 
pursuant to this paragraph. . . . 
 
JA116-17.  The term "this paragraph" must be interpreted as 
referring, at a minimum, to paragraph 17a (and not just paragraph 
17a(2)).19  Accordingly, paragraph 17a(2) appears to prohibit any 
                     
19
.  This interpretation is dictated by the analogous provisions 
of the district court's order of September 21, 1990.  Paragraph 
4E of that order provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
 E. Release categories shall be: 
 
 (1)  a person admitted to prison under prior 
orders of the court who is still detained but 
  
person charged with an enumerated offense from being released 
pursuant to paragraph 17a.  And since, as noted above, the City 
was required to list only those inmates who were eligible for 
release under paragraph 17a, it seems to follow that no inmates 
charged with "enumerated" offenses (including those inmates who 
also had detainers) were required to be listed. 
 In holding that the City was properly found in 
contempt, the majority relies in large part on what it views as 
(..continued) 
who would not be admitted under this order as 
now modified; 
 
 (2)  a prisoner held in default of the lowest 
amount of percentage bail as necessary to 
reduce the population in all institutions to 
the maximum allowable.  If inmates considered 
for release under this paragraph are held in 
default of equal amounts of bail, preference 
shall be given to the inmate held the longest 
time. 
 
 (3)  a person charged with offenses 
enumerated in paragraphs 3A and B shall not 
be released pursuant to this paragraph. 
 
JA103-04 (emphasis added).  Since paragraph 4E(3) does not 
provide for the release of any persons, the prohibition in that 
provision against release "pursuant to this paragraph" must at a 
minimum mean release pursuant to paragraph 4E (and specifically 
paragraph 4E(1) and (2)). 
  
    Paragraph 17a(1) and (2) of the 1991 Consent Decree restated 
paragraph 4E(1)-(3) of the September 21, 1990 order.  
Consequently, the statement in paragraph 17a(2) of the 1991 
Consent Decree that "[p]ersons charged with offenses enumerated 
in paragraphs 3A and 3B shall not be released pursuant to this 
paragraph" should be given the same interpretation as the 
virtually identical language in paragraph 4E(3) of the September 
21, 1990 order. 
  
the "`thrust'" of the 1991 Consent Decree, i.e., "to move out of 
the Philadelphia prisons those who could be reasonably moved 
elsewhere."  Maj. Typescript at 27.  Even if we were required in 
this appeal to ascertain the best interpretation of the 1991 
Consent Decree, I would, for the reasons explained above, have 
serious reservations concerning the majority's interpretation.  
But since, as the majority concedes, "ambiguities redound to the 
benefit of the contemnor," id., it seems quite clear that the 
City was not properly held in contempt for ceasing to list the 
inmates at issue here.20 
                     
20
.  The plaintiffs defend the district court's holding on a 
different ground.  They argue that the City was prevented from 
retaining custody of such inmates with detainers pursuant to 
paragraph 17a(1) of the 1991 Consent Decree.  This provision, as 
previously noted, requires the listing of: 
 
 all persons admitted to the prisons under 
prior orders of the court who are still 
detained but who would not be admitted under 
the provisions of this order as now modified. 
 
JA116.  The plaintiffs argue that such persons could not be 
"admitted" to the Philadelphia prison system as a result of 
paragraph 2h of the 1986 Consent Decree, which states that "[n]o 
federal or state prisoners other than inmates detained for 
immediate court appearances, shall be housed within the 
Philadelphia Prison System, except for those federal prisoners in 
the custody of the United States Marshal." JA92.  See Appellees' 
Br. at 35. 
 
    I am not persuaded that the district court's holding can be 
sustained on this ground, which neither the district court nor 
the majority of this panel has embraced.  For one thing, this 
argument does not address the language of paragraph 17a(2) of the 
1991 Consent Decree, which, as explained above in text, appears 
to prohibit the release of the inmates in question.  
Consequently, even if the plaintiffs' interpretation of paragraph 
17a(1) were accepted, their argument would at best create an 
  
 
 B.  DANGEROUS INMATES.  I believe that the district 
court also erred in holding the City in contempt for ceasing to 
list inmates who would pose an imminent danger to the community 
or to themselves.  
 Paragraph 4 of the 1986 Consent Decree provides strong 
support for the City's argument that it was not required to list 
dangerous inmates.  This provision plainly states that the "City 
Defendants . . . agree not to seek the release of any person 
whose release would constitute an imminent threat to public 
safety or to the inmates' own health, safety or welfare."  JA93 
(emphasis added).  Since, as previously discussed and as the 
majority itself appears to recognize (Maj. typescript at 23), the 
City was not obligated to list inmates who were not eligible for 
release, it follows that, as long as paragraph 4 of the 1986 
Consent Decree remained in effect, the City was not required to 
list inmates that it regarded as dangerous.  
 The district court and the majority argue that 
paragraph 4 of the 1986 Consent Decree was superseded by 
paragraph 18 of the 1991 Consent Decree.  This latter provision 
states: 
 The procedures set forth in Paragraph 17 of 
this Stipulation and Agreement shall 
supersede Paragraphs 4.A.-C. of the September 
22, 1990 Order.  Otherwise, this Stipulation 
(..continued) 
ambiguity and, as the court notes, "[t]he resolution of 
ambiguities ought to favor the party charged with contempt."  
Maj. typescript at 18. 
  
and Agreement shall not affect the operation 
of the September 22, 1990 Order or Paragraphs 
1 and 2.a-c and h-l of the remedial 
provisions of the Consent Order of December 
30, 1986, as amended, which shall remain in 
full force and effect except as they may be 
further amended. 
 
JA118-119. 
 
 In my view, this provision is at least ambiguous as to 
whether Paragraph 4 of the 1986 Consent Order was superseded.  
While the court makes a rather elaborate argument in favor of 
supersedure (see Maj. typescript at 29-34), a very reasonable 
argument can be made in favor of a contrary interpretation.  
Because Paragraph 18 of the 1991 Consent Decree expressly 
provides for certain portions of prior orders (but not paragraph 
4 of the 1986 Consent Decree) to be superseded, it can be argued 
with some force that no other supersedure should be inferred.  As 
the majority notes, "[t]he resolution of ambiguities ought to 
favor the party charged with contempt."  Maj. typescript at 18.   
Thus, because there are substantial ambiguities here, I think 
that the district court erred in holding the City in contempt for 
ceasing to list inmates whom the City regarded as dangerous.  
 I am particularly troubled by the district court's 
holding because of its potential impact on the public safety.  
One of the most basic and important responsibilities of a 
municipal government is to protect the safety of its people.  It 
therefore seems difficult to imagine that any municipal 
government would voluntarily agree to participate in the 
  
premature release of inmates whom it believes will pose an 
imminent threat to the community.  To be sure, if a municipal 
government unambiguously agrees to take such action, a court may 
have no alternative but to enforce the agreement.  But unless the 
agreement is truly unambiguous, I would think that a court 
cognizant of its responsibilities to the community would hesitate 
to require the municipality to follow a course of action that is 
antithetical to the municipality's most basic obligations and 
contrary to the public safety. 
 In conclusion, I do not think that the City violated 
any specific and definite provision of any order when it stopped 
listing any of the categories of inmates at issue in this appeal.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court order at issue in 
its entirety.            
 
